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Abstract 
This study investigates the effects of gender quotas in national elections on political 
participation, public policy, and corruption in Latin America. We are able to replicate the 
findings from previous research that women in politics do affect these outcomes, but 
only when we treat the number of women in parliament as exogenous. We argue, 
however, that the introduction of gender quotas caused an – in this context – 
exogenous increase in women’s representation, and while we find that quotas in Latin 
America increased the number of women in parliament, we find no substantial effects 
beyond mere representation. The mechanisms for these findings are scrutinized, and we 
find no indications that quota women are more marginalized than other elected women 
in Latin American parliaments. Hence, increasing women’s representation by means of 
gender quotas may not result in the same outcomes as an increased representation in 
non-quota elections. 
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1 Introduction 
Women account for half of the world’s population, but hold just short of one-fifth of the 
parliamentarian seats worldwide. Fifteen years ago the same figure stood at just eleven percent (IPU 
statistical archive). Over these years, affirmative actions have been introduced in more than 100 
countries around the world in order to increase the number of women in politics, either by 
governments or by political parties of own accord. In terms of legal electoral quotas, Latin America 
has been in the forefront; the first democratic country to adopt a gender quota in national elections 
was Argentina in 1991, and throughout that decade many Latin American countries followed suit 
(Gray 2003). As of today, eleven of the eighteen countries in Latin America have introduced gender 
quotas in national elections, making Latin America the region in the world with the highest share of 
quota countries. 
The introduction of quotas to increase women’s participation raises the question of what effects we 
can expect from an increased political power for women. The arguments usually put forward for 
quotas are based on justice, women’s experiences, women’s interests, and the importance of female 
politicians as role models (Dahlerup 2003). In particular, it is argued that women have different 
biological or socially constructed experiences than men, or even that men and women have 
conflicting interests, making it likely that they also inhibit different preferences, and empirical 
research confirms this (e.g., Lott and Kenny 1999; Edlund and Pande 2002; Edlund et al. 2005; Funk 
and Gathmann 2008; Miller 2008; Finseraas et al. 2012). If preferences are different, it is also 
possible that they may not be fully taken account of without proper female representation. Again, 
empirical evidence seems to support this; results from cross-sectional comparisons show that 
increased political representation of women is correlated with different spending priorities (e.g., 
Thomas 1991; Besley and Case 2003) and that there is a correlation between increased female 
representation and less corruption (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001).  
These results rarely imply causation though. One obvious concern is that women may be better 
represented in areas where voters have specific political preferences or that less corrupt societies 
elect more women. A few studies have used econometric techniques that help identify causal effects 
of women in politics: Clots-Figueras (2011) studies close elections between women and men in India 
and finds that elected women invest more in education, Rehavi (2007) finds that increasing the 
number of women in politics led to increased public welfare expenditure in the U.S. during the 
1990s, and Svaleryd (2002) uses longitudinal data and finds that Swedish municipal boards with 
increased female representation tend to increase spending on child care relative to spending on the 
elderly. 
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However, few studies have utilized the introduction of gender quotas in politics to look at the effects 
of policies. Chattopadhay and Duflo (2004) use the randomized introduction of a gender quota at the 
local level in India, and find that policies on issues closer to the preferences of women were 
implemented more often in villages with female chiefs, and Beaman et al. (2009), using the same 
setting as Chattopadhay and Duflo (2004), find changing gender norms following the quota. Hence, 
there are claims of various effects of women’s representation. However, given that many gender 
norms and roles are highly context specific, one can hardly expect to always find the same effects in 
different societies. Furthermore, it is likely that different kinds of quotas at different levels of 
governance also produce differing results, as decision making procedures, policy responsibilities, and 
closeness to the electorate may differ. 
In the present article, we aim to identify the impacts of the increased number of female politicians in 
national parliaments caused by the extensive introduction of quotas for women in Latin American 
countries. Specifically, we look at the impacts on a group of outcomes that previous research has 
suggested that women in politics should affect, including corruption, women’s political participation, 
and policies on education and health. By using national-level rather than more local-level quotas this 
study will broaden the knowledge of the effects of quotas. Furthermore, the social context in the 
Latin American countries likely differs from that in other countries previously investigated. Given the 
potential impact and political sensitivity of the introduction of quotas in these countries, studying 
their effects is of great importance. 
Our results show that while the quotas substantially increased the number of women in parliament, 
they had no measurable effects on policy, political participation, or corruption. However, we find 
that estimations not utilizing the quota introduction, instead looking at variation in the share of 
women in parliament not caused by quota measures, often show correlations between female 
representation in parliament and the mentioned outcomes. This seems to imply either that women 
elected through quotas differ from other elected women, or that the correlations between women in 
parliament and our outcomes are spurious. In either case, it suggests that quotas have been 
ineffective with respect to these issues in Latin America. Further analysis also shows that the quotas 
did increase the share of women in ministerial positions, suggesting that quota parliamentarians are 
not more marginalized than other elected women.  
2 Theory and Expectations 
This section presents theory on how quotas may be effective in changing policy, how and why quotas 
were introduced in Latin America, and whether one can consider them exogenous to other 
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developments. Based on these discussions and the existing literature, we then discuss what effects of 
quotas we can expect to find in the Latin American context. 
2.1 Theory on Quota Effects 
The motivations for implementing gender quotas point to several mechanisms through which quotas 
are thought to have effects beyond representation. Dahlerup (2003) presents four arguments: a 
justice argument, implying that women have the right to half of the representative seats as they 
constitute half of the population; an experience argument, implying that the gender-specific 
experiences of women, whether biological or socially constructed, need to be represented; an 
interest group argument, arguing that men and women may have conflicting interests and, 
consequently, men cannot represent women; and a role model argument, where the existence of 
female politicians is thought to help other women engage in politics. Araújo and García (2006) add 
the argument that a higher female representation may lend further legitimacy to the democratic 
system and its institutions. 
While the justice argument is more concerned with representation per se, having different 
experiences or interests implies that men and women may have different preferences over policy. 
However, despite differences in preferences, the identity of the policymaker need not affect policy. 
This is maybe most famously formulated in Downs’ (1957) median voter theorem, which predicts 
that as long as candidates can commit to policies, political competition leads to an allocation that is 
preferred by the median voter irrespective of the identity of the politician. There is nevertheless 
ample evidence that the identity of the politician can indeed have an effect on policy: Pande (2003) 
and Besley et al. (2004) find that political reservations in local governments for disadvantaged castes 
in India affected the provision of public goods, and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) and Clots-
Figueras (2011) present similar findings for reservations for women. These effects can be better 
explained in alternative models such as the citizen candidate model, where political candidates 
cannot completely commit to a policy platform, and if they get elected they try to implement their 
own political agenda (e.g., Besley and Coate 1997; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004).  
So when should we expect to find effects of gender quotas on policy? Duflo (2005b) presents three 
necessary conditions for gender quotas to affect the provision of public goods. Firstly, the quotas 
need to be effective in raising the number of elected women. If not, they have not had an effect on 
the decision making bodies. Secondly, policy preferences must differ between men and women, as 
there would otherwise be no reason to expect female politicians to behave differently than their 
male colleagues. Thirdly, the identity of a policymaker must affect his or her decision, or women’s 
differential preferences would already have been represented (albeit by male politicians). 
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Moving away from public goods, the identity of a politician may be even more important if the goods 
that he or she allocates are low spillover goods, i.e., goods that mainly benefit their direct 
beneficiaries, since it may increase the probability of receiving such goods for the group that the 
politician identifies with (Besley et al. 2004). This argument has been put forward with respect to 
ethnic or geographically clustered groups that may benefit from, e.g., a well, yet when it comes to 
gender, the degree of spillover is not as clear. In fact, viewing the household as one decision maker 
or a unit that maximizes total household welfare and where the partners can commit to cast their 
votes in a particular way, it is unclear whether there should be a difference in political preferences 
between the sexes. However, the household as one unit often does not seem to adequately describe 
reality, since a household usually does not behave as an efficient unit (e.g., Duflo and Udry 2004; 
Duflo 2005a). Furthermore, studies of political preferences systematically do find differences 
between the sexes (e.g. Lott and Kenny 1999; Edlund and Pande 2001). 
2.2 Quotas in Latin America and Expected Effects 
Latin America is the region in the world where electoral quotas have been implemented most 
extensively. Argentina was the first democratic country in the world to have a national electoral 
quota in 1991 and many countries followed suite in the late 1990s. Most countries introduced their 
first quotas in 1996 or 1997, and the spread of quotas in the region indicates a strong contagion 
effect (Escobar-Lemmon and Robinson 2005). Table 1 shows the years of first quota introduction in 
Latin American countries. 
2.2.1 What Determined Quota Introductions in Latin America? 
Utilizing the introduction of gender quotas in order to identify effects of women in politics raises the 
question of what determined the timings of quota introductions in Latin America. This is important if 
one considers to what extent the quota introductions were exogenous to changing gender equity 
norms in society. Previous authors have argued that recommendations from international 
organizations, such as the UN, the EU, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), and the OSCE have been 
highly influential in the introduction of quotas in Latin America (e.g., Dahlerup 2003), and so have 
international agreements, in particular the Platform for Action in 1995 at the fourth Women’s World 
Conference in Beijing (Htun and Jones 2001; Schwindt-Bayer 2009; True and Mintrom 2001). This 
platform urged governments to ensure equal access and full participation in political decision 
making, and the introduction of gender quotas was suggested as a specific measure. This is the 
reason, Peschard (2003) argues, why so many Latin American countries introduced quotas in 1996 
and 1997. In fact, the only countries to pass laws on quotas before the Beijing conference were 
Argentina and Bolivia. Lubertino (2003) argues that a crucial factor for the implementation of quotas 
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in Argentina was the participation of Argentinean women in the UN Women’s Conference in Nairobi 
in 1985.  
But why have only some Latin American countries introduced quotas? To answer this question, it is 
insightful to look at the countries that currently do not have any quotas. For instance, gender quotas 
have been deemed unconstitutional in some countries. This happened in both Uruguay in 1988 and 
in Colombia in 2000, and in Venezuela the quota law introduced in 1997 was declared 
unconstitutional in 2000 and subsequently removed (quotaproject.org). However, Uruguay has now 
passed a new electoral law stipulating a 33 percent quota that will go into effect in the 2014 
elections. In Chile, the former president Michelle Bachelet proposed a gender quota bill that did not 
pass in the parliament, and in Guatemala a quota bill did not reach the required two-thirds majority 
needed for implementation. Nicaragua has a law on “the promotion of the necessary measures, in 
conformity with the Law of the matter, in order to establish a proportional percentage of women and 
men to the positions on the electoral lists of the national /…/ Parliament” (quotaproject.org), but no 
binding quota law. In El Salvador, women’s movements have lobbied for a quota law but without 
success. Hence, it seems that most of the countries that have not introduced quota laws have come 
close to doing so, lending support to the idea of the pool of Latin American non-quota countries 
being a potential control group for the Latin American quota countries. We take this discussion a bit 
further in the empirical strategy section below, where we propose some quantitative tests for the 
exogeneity of the quota introduction. 
2.2.2 What Effects Can We Expect from Quotas? 
There is a lack of agreement in the literature with respect to which outcome variables are most likely 
affected by gender quotas (Wängnerud 2009). We therefore focus on a wide set of outcomes, and in 
order to identify key areas that we think may have been affected by the quotas we will rely on both 
theory and previous empirical literature. In addition, we will use survey data to help us get a picture 
of the Latin American context regarding gender and preferences. Below, we motivate the three main 
areas covered: government policies, women’s political participation, and corruption. 
2.2.2.1 Government Policy 
The previous literature is full of suggestions about the effects of women in politics on government 
policy. Besley and Case (2003) report that male and female politicians in the US behave differently 
with regard to spending priorities, with women putting more focus on education and support for 
families and children. Clots-Figueras (2011) studies elections in India where either a man or a woman 
closely beat an opponent of the other sex, and similarly finds that women invest more in education. 
Rehavi (2007) finds that increasing the number of women in politics led to increased public welfare 
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expenditure in the U.S. in the 1990s, and Svaleryd (2002) shows that more females in Swedish 
municipalities increase childcare expenditure relative to spending on the elderly. Although not 
dealing with female politicians per se, studies from the US have also found that granting suffrage to 
women increased both the size of the state (Lott and Kenny 1999) and health spending (Miller 2008), 
and in Switzerland female suffrage led to a small increase in the size of government and a larger shift 
in the scope of government toward social expenditures (Funk and Gathmann 2008). As mentioned 
earlier, Chattopadhay and Duflo (2004) find that policies on issues closer to the preferences of 
women were implemented more often in Indian villages with female chiefs (randomly allocated by a 
quota). On the other hand, Campa (2011), using a regression discontinuity design, finds no effects of 
a gender quota on spending in Spanish municipalities. 
When investigating the effects of quotas it is important to contextualize the expected effects, as 
gender roles are social products and differ widely across the globe (Wängnerud 2009). This implies 
that gender gaps in political preferences are by no means fixed across time and space. For instance, 
in the OECD countries, women had more conservative political preferences than men and tended to 
vote for bourgeois parties in the 1960s (Campbell et al. 1960). Since then, women’s political 
preferences have gradually shifted leftwards all over the OECD area, and in Scandinavia women are 
now more left-leaning than men (Inglehart and Norris 2000). A range of studies have revealed that 
gender gaps in political preferences are prevalent across the world and regarding a broad range of 
policies (e.g., Svallfors 1997; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Alvarez and McCaffery 2003; Lott and 
Kenny 1999; Aidt and Dallal 2008; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004), but they also show differences 
across countries and time periods. In Latin America, women are more likely than men to vote for 
conservative parties (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005).  
Therefore, we also expect the effects of quotas to be context dependent. Some differences between 
men and women are, however, universal in direction (although not in degree), such as women 
conducting more paid and unpaid care work than men and also bearing greater responsibility for 
childcare. An indisputable fact is also the difference between the sexes in reproductive capacity; i.e., 
women bear children and thus for example are more vulnerable to health risks associated with birth. 
One may therefore expect that policies that concern women more than men are more likely to 
change as a result of higher female political representation. Investigating the effects of the gender 
quota in Argentina, Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) find that it seems to have induced an increase in 
parliamentary bills concerning women’s issues such as reproductive health and violence against 
women, but also that this increased attention did not carry over to changes in policy outcomes. 
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In less obvious cases, however, it is important not to take differences in political preferences 
between men and women for granted. As we expect that policies on issues closer to the preferences 
of women are more likely to be affected, we use the Latinobarometer survey (described in the data 
section) to get a picture of preference differences between men and women in Latin America1. We 
find that women are more inclined than men to think that the state is responsible for health care and 
for education. However, compared to men, women also to a greater extent perceive that taxes are 
too high. Hence, while spending priorities may very well differ depending on women’s 
representation, we should not automatically expect the results from the US of a larger state to 
automatically carry over to Latin America.  
2.2.2.2 Women’s Political Participation 
One part of the motivation of gender quotas in politics is that female politicians may act as role 
models and pave the way for other women in politics. Empirical evidence from India supports this 
view: Beaman et al. (2009) show that people’s gender stereotypes weaken and that attitudes toward 
women as policymakers become less biased once they have been exposed to female leaders, 
supplying robust evidence that women’s quotas may be effectively used to promote gender equality 
by reducing the gender bias of societal norms. An important question is whether this result can be 
generalized to other contexts and to national-level quotas.  
Again consulting the Latinobarometer data2, we find clear differences between men and women in 
political participation in Latin America prior to the quotas. In particular, women were less likely to 
participate in demonstrations and to vote, and they were more likely to state that politics is 
complicated, that they were not interested in politics, and that they did not engage in politics in 
general. Given these apparent inequalities, it is important to investigate whether more women in 
parliaments has affected women’s political interests and/or ability to participate in the political 
sphere. Using the Latinobarometer data from 2005, Zetterberg (2009) shows that political 
participation is not higher in countries that have introduced quotas. While he also controls for lagged 
(from 1996) control variables, he does not fully exploit the data to include all years and does not 
make use of country fixed effects or control for trends in the variables of interest. As will be 
explained in the empirical strategy, we control for time trends and employ difference in differences 
(and also triple differences by exploiting men as another control group), and hence we regard our 
results as more credible in terms of identifying causal effects.  
 
                                                          
1
 These results are available upon request. 
2
 Again, the results are available upon request. 
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2.2.2.3 Corruption 
Finally, we move on to investigate the effects on corruption, which is an area where previous studies 
have shown clear correlations between female representation and less corruption and have argued 
for a causal interpretation of these correlations as effects of women in parliament. Based on micro 
studies showing that women behave more altruistically and honestly than men, Dollar et al. (2001) 
put forward the hypothesis that more women in parliaments should lead to less corruption. Using 
data from the corruption index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), they find support 
for their hypothesis in cross-country regressions and conclude that increasing the number of women 
in parliament is likely to reduce corruption. In a similar fashion, Swamy et al. (2001) first analyze data 
from the World Values Surveys and show that women on average have a more negative attitude 
toward bribe-taking. They then conduct a cross-country study using the Corruption Perception Index 
from Transparency International and also find a negative coefficient of women in parliament on 
corruption.  
An inherent problem in these previous studies is that their identification strategies are vulnerable to 
omitted variables bias, a critique offered by, e.g., Goetz (2007). For instance, having elections that 
are more democratic, a higher level of transparency in the democratic institutions or a higher degree 
of political participation may lead to both less corruption and more women in parliaments at the 
same time. The previous studies acknowledge this problem and do include control variables (Dollar 
et al. 2001 control for civil liberties and Swamy et al. 2001 for political rights, both measures 
collected by Freedom House). In the present article, we instead exploit the introduction of quotas to 
investigate the effects of women in politics on corruption in Latin America.   
Context is likely to be important also with respect to corruption. The previous studies pooled 
together around 100 countries and found a correlation between women in politics and corruption. 
While the causality of the relationship can clearly be contested, it is also likely that it masks 
heterogeneity across country groups. Alatas et al. (2011) make this point evident by conducting an 
economic experiment in Australia, India, Indonesia, and Singapore. They show that while women are 
less tolerant of corruption than men in Australia, there are no gender differences in the propensities 
to engage in and punish corrupt behavior in the other countries. 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The dependent variables are intended to cover our three main areas of investigation, namely 
policies, political participation, and corruption. The descriptions and sources of these variables, as 
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well as of our independent variables of main interest, are presented in Table 2, and we discuss them 
below.  
 
Using data from the Global Database of Quotas for Women (quotaproject.org) and the country-
specific references therein, we classify a country as a quota country if it introduced some legal quota 
for women in its national parliament during our period of investigation, i.e., 1985-2009. We also 
create two variables representing the scope of the quotas in the lower (or only) house (Q_size_lo) 
and upper house of parliament (Q_size_up), measuring the share of candidates that are required to 
be women. They range from 0 for periods and countries with no quotas to 1 in the hypothetical case 
of a quota that requires all candidates to be women. The data on the share of women in parliament 
is taken from the PARLINE database on national parliaments from the Inter-Parliamentary Union 
(www.ipu.org). Again, we separate this measure into women in the lower house (WiP_lo) and upper 
house (WiP_up) of parliament. The data on quotas and women in parliament is available for all years 
of investigation. We also use data on the share of women ministers (female_ministers) as used by 
Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005). This data includes all our countries for all years of 
democracy from 1980 to 2003. 
To operationalize the effects of quotas on policies, we first look at government consumption as a 
share of GDP. This measure, as well as the total tax revenues, should be a good proxy for the size of 
the state. We also investigate effects on spending on certain sectors of the economy, namely on 
education, health, social security, and social spending in general (which is the sum of the former 
three plus housing expenses). For these spending measures, we have data since at least 1990 from 
the World Development Indicators (WDI) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC).  
To investigate the effects of quotas on political participation, we mainly use data from the 
Latinobarometer. The Latinobarometer is an annual survey (with a gap in 1999) that started in 1995 
and now includes 18 countries in Latin America, with about 20,000 respondents per wave. In 1995, 
only 8 countries were included in the survey, but already in 1996 the number was increased to 173. In 
total, we have 216,998 observations from 18 countries from the years 1995 to 2007. A disadvantage 
of this survey material is that for the group of countries that passed quota laws around 1997, there is 
only data for a few years prior to the first quota election. The variables we focus on in assessing the 
effects on political participation are frequency of talking about political issues with friends, political 
                                                          
3
 The only country under study not included in 1996 is the Dominican Republic, which was included for the first 
time in 2004. 
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interest, and whether the respondent would vote if there were an election the Sunday after the 
interview. We also look at confidence in the national congress and satisfaction with democracy, 
which are thought to reflect to what extent men and women are satisfied with the democratic 
system and its institutions. For all variables from the Latinobarometer, we use the (weighted) 
average for women in each country and year. Using micro-level data, it is also possible to create 
measures on the gender gap in participation, which in turn enables us to use the “difference in 
difference in differences” approach further elaborated on in the empirical strategy section below. All 
gap measures are created as the average value for men less the average value for women in the 
same year and country. As a complementary measure on political participation, we also include 
official figures on electoral turnout from the IDEA voter turnout database. Unfortunately, this data is 
not measured by gender, so we can only observe the aggregate development of men and women 
before and after quotas. 
To measure corruption we use the corruption component of the International Country Risk Group’s 
index on political risk (ICRG), which is a module that assesses corruption in the political system. It 
may sound a bit too wide in scope to be connected to the number of women in parliament, but is in 
fact the measure used in the previously discussed study by Dollar et al. (2001).  
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
In order to investigate the effects of quotas on the outcomes described above, and to assess the 
actual mechanism of increased women in parliaments, we proceed in several steps in our empirical 
investigation, as described below. Since a vital part of this study relies on quotas being effective in 
raising the number of women in national parliaments and on their introduction being exogenous in 
settings where the share of women in parliament is not, we will start by discussing how to assess 
these assumptions. We then move on to describe our strategy for estimating the effects of gender 
quotas on other variables. 
3.2.1 The Effect of Quotas on the Number of Women in Parliament 
Though investigated in previous literature, it is not evident to what extent gender quotas in general 
have actually increased the number of women in parliaments in Latin America. Whereas some 
countries in other parts of the world have introduced gender quotas in the form of reserved seats 
guaranteeing women a specific share of the seats in parliament, the quota countries in Latin America 
have all introduced so-called list quotas where a specified share of all party candidates must be 
women. This makes the actual outcome in terms of representation uncertain. Moreover, the 
countries within the region also differ in terms of whether voters are free to choose which 
candidates on a party’s list to vote for or whether the orders of candidates are fixed (open vs. closed 
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lists), whether there is a placement mandate implying that parties have to place women on certain 
(more electable) positions on the lists, and to what degree there are sanctions against parties that do 
not comply with the quota law. Jones (2009), looking at data at the election district level in Latin 
America, shows that in Latin America the effects of national election quotas on representation vary 
depending on both quota and election rules, as well as district size. The main conclusion is that as 
long as there is enforcement, both open and closed list quotas are effective although closed lists are 
slightly more so. As dividing quotas into categories may create almost as many categories as there 
are elections, we keep the analysis simple by defining only the size of the legal quota irrespective of 
the rules surrounding it. 
Hence, in order to see to what extent quotas have been effective, we start by estimating the effect of 
quotas on the share of women in national parliaments, which will serve several purposes: firstly, it 
will help us understand to what extent quotas in general have been effective in Latin America and 
hence guide us on how to interpret later results on quota effects; secondly, it will give us an empirical 
understanding of what the processes of quota implementations looked like; and thirdly, it will serve 
as a benchmark test of whether significant effects of quotas can be identified within our sample. The 
last point is important since if we cannot find significant effects of quotas on women in parliament 
we can not reasonably expect to find such effects on other variables either. This may be either 
because quotas have not been effective in raising the share of women in parliament (which would 
make the theoretical mechanism redundant), or because our sample is too small to find significant 
effects.  
As our data is limited to the 18 countries in Latin America and to elections held since 1985, we try to 
keep the empirical model fairly simple. Still, at least two factors seem important to account for: that 
the countries start off with quite different shares of women in parliament before any quotas were 
introduced, and that the effects of the quotas have taken some time to come about in many 
countries. The latter is because laws were often not properly enforced or not designed sharply 
enough to have an effect initially. Over time, adjustments were made and laws were complied with 
to a larger extent.  
To account for these factors, we use fixed effects estimations and hold the possibility open to include 
lagged values of the quota variable. Our benchmark estimation for the share of women in parliament 
for country c at time t thus takes the form: 
cttcctcct sizeQsizeQtfWiP   1,21 __)( , 
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where WiP stands for the share of women in parliament and Q_size measures the scope of the 
quotas. In this setup, the underlying assumption of our identification depends on how we define the 
counterfactual time trend (i.e., the functional form of )(tf ). We will use two alternative versions. 
First we will allow for year fixed effects ))(( ttf  , hence introducing year dummies common to all 
countries. This is a typical “difference-in-differences” (DiD) setup, where the underlying assumption 
is that all countries would follow the same path (albeit from different starting points) in the absence 
of quotas. Then we will also test our results by using country-specific time trends ))(( ttf c   , 
which implies that there is a linear time trend for each country and that the introduction of quotas 
will lead to deviations from that trend. This last setup allows for differences in development between 
countries even without quotas, but has the disadvantages of possibly introducing “too much” 
flexibility in a model applied to such a short panel as ours, and of being vulnerable to non-linearities 
in the time trends4.  
As a further robustness check, we will also try the alternative model 
ctctctctcct TsizeQsizeQtfWiP   __)( 21 , 
where ctT  is a time variable that starts at 1 the year after the quota introduction. This setup basically 
does the same as before but allows for a new time trend after the quota introduction, rather than 
just introducing a lag.  
3.2.2 On the Exogeneity of Quota Introduction 
If gender quotas affect our outcome variables of interest by increasing the number of women in 
parliament, then why do we not just observe the share of women in parliament? The answer is of 
course that the share of women in parliament in different countries is likely correlated with other 
variables such as what parties and politics the voters have opted for in the last election, or cross-
country differences in gender attitudes. This makes the share of women in parliament an 
endogenous variable in most settings. Contrary to this, based on discussions in the previous 
literature, we have argued that the introduction of gender quotas is potentially exogenous in Latin 
America. To some extent this has to be taken on faith, although we are able to perform some tests of 
the endogeneity of the quota introductions. 
                                                          
4
 This last point may be serious as quotas are always implemented towards the end of the panel, making them 
prone to pick up effects that really should be attributed to a convex or concave time trend. However, the 
introduction of more flexible functional forms (such as entering a country-specific squared time term) would 
introduce a high level of collinearity between the time controls and the quota variables. 
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First, there may be reason to believe that there were different attitudes to women in politics in the 
quota and non-quota countries before the introductions of quotas, which would seriously question 
our identifying assumptions. We test this assumption by checking for any pre-quota differences in 
the number of women in parliament. This is done by regressing the number of women in parliament 
on a common time trend and its square5, and a dummy, Q_country, for being a quota country (i.e., a 
country introducing quotas at some point in time). We only use observations on elections prior to 
any quota introductions. 
ctcct countryQttWiP   _
2
21  
If our estimation of   is statistically significantly different from zero, then the quota introductions 
were correlated with pre-quota levels of women in parliament and the assumption of exogeneity 
seems less reasonable.  
Moreover, we exploit the fact that some of the quota countries are bicameral. If the introduction of 
quotas in the lower houses came about due to changes in the underlying factors that made ”women 
in parliament” endogenous in the first place, then the introduction of lower house quotas should also 
be correlated with the share of women in parliament in the upper houses. Hence, we are able to 
perform a placebo test by regressing the share of women in the upper house on the introduction of 
gender quotas in the lower house. Failing to find such correlations (given that we can find such 
correlations using the actual upper house quotas of course) would greatly strengthen the exogeneity 
assumption of the quota introductions. 
3.2.3 The Effects of Quotas on Policy, Participation, and Corruption 
Turning to our estimations of the effects of quotas on policy, political participation, and corruption, 
our empirical strategy differs a bit from that for the effects on women’s representation, as we now 
almost always have yearly data. We want to capture the long-term effects of quotas since they may 
not be immediate, the influence of new parliamentarians may increase with experience, and many of 
our explanatory variables may change only slowly. Hence, for any dependent variable cty , we 
estimate the following fixed effects model: 
ctctctcct TsizeQsizeQtgy   __)( 21 , 
where T is a time variable that equals 0 in non-quota years and starts at 1 the year after the quota 
introduction. Hence, 1  will give us an estimate of the immediate effect of the quota introduction, 
                                                          
5
 Note that in this case the time trend is common to all countries and the Q_country variable is stable over 
time, which makes controlling for a non-linear trend much less problematic than before. 
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while the interaction term allows the quota to give rise to a new trend in the outcome variable. 
Again, we start with a standard DiD setup with year fixed effects, so that ttg )( . As discussed 
before, this setup is robust to common non-linearities in the trend and assumes the countries to 
have similar developments in the absence of quotas. As we now typically have more observations 
than in the estimations of women in parliament, we conduct a robustness check by allowing for both 
year fixed effects and country-specific time trends, so that ttg ct  )( . The result of the latter 
setup is that we no longer rely on the outcomes of non-quota countries as counterfactuals, which 
makes effects harder to find but also less reliant on the similar trends assumption. Finally, for the 
variables based on micro-level data from the Latinobarometer (Notvoting, Donttalkpolitics, 
Notinterestedpol, Noconf.congress, and Satisfieddemocracy), we create gap measures (the average of 
males minus the average of females) in order to exploit yet another difference, thereby creating DDD 
(difference-in-difference-in-differences) estimators. Hence, in these cases the estimates of 1  and 
2  will show us whether the quota caused women’s development to differ from that of men. 
3.2.4 Further Econometric Issues  
Kezdi (2003) and Bertrand et al. (2004) caution against trusting estimates from DiD regressions in 
finite samples – estimations much like the ones described in previous sections – if there is reason to 
believe that there is serial correlation in variables and error terms. Given that our panel is fairly 
narrow (consisting of 18 countries), clustering of the standard errors at the country level to reduce 
this bias may perform rather badly. Instead, we use the Newey-West estimator for standard errors, 
assuming heteroskedastic error terms and serial correlation up to two periods back. As a robustness 
check, we also clustered the standard errors at the country level (results are available upon request), 
yet the interpretations of our results remained unchanged. 
4 Results 
4.1 Quota Effects on the Share of Women in Parliament 
Table 3 presents results from regressions to establish the effect of introducing women quotas on the 
actual election outcomes in terms of the share of women in parliament. Columns 1 and 2 show a 
regression of the share of women in parliament (henceforth WiP) on a time trend common to all 
countries, and a quota dummy and the scope of the quota, respectively. We do not take into account 
the type of quota introduced, such as whether there were any placement mandates or whether 
there were open or closed lists, as we try to keep the specification as simple as possible due to the 
limited number of elections in the Latin American countries since 1985. In Column 1 we can see that, 
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on average, there is a small yet positive and statistically significant time trend, implying that the 
share of women in parliaments increases by about 0.5 percentage points per annum in the absence 
of gender quotas. Imposing a gender quota, however, yields an increase of 0.22 of the value of that 
quota (Column 2). That is, a quota stipulating that at least 30 percent of the candidates in an election 
ought to be women raises the share of women in parliament by about 7 percentage points on 
average.  
At a first glance, this may seem like a rather small figure. However, one should remember three 
things: that countries already had some women in parliament prior to the quota, that in many cases 
there is no placement mandate of candidates, and that voters may often choose whom to vote for 
among the candidates on the lists. Moreover, if one compares the effect of the quota to the time 
trend, the result of a 30 percent quota is equivalent to an increase of the share of women in 
parliament that would have taken more than 14 years to achieve without it. 
Column 3 introduces year dummies rather than a linear time trend, making the parameter somewhat 
larger, while Column 4 introduces country-specific time trends, resulting in a decrease of the quota 
scope parameter to about half its size. However, it is difficult to say to what extent the time 
parameters pick up gradual increases of WiP in quota countries, as the model assumes an immediate 
and pertaining effect of the quota. This becomes evident in Columns 5 and 6, where we add a lagged 
value of the scope of the quota (i.e., the last election’s quota) in order to take into account the fact 
that many countries revised and sharpened the rules of the quota to make sure that parties 
conformed to it. Indeed, the aggregated effect of the quota introduction is now a little larger than it 
was in the simpler estimations, and from the size of the parameters it is evident that the effect of a 
quota becomes much larger in time for the second election. Hence, it is important to recognize that 
the introductions of quotas to some extent have gradual effects over time. In Columns 7 and 8, we 
interact the quota variable with a time variable rather than using a one period lag, and obtain 
comparable results.  
To save space, the results from identical estimations on the effects of quotas in the upper house are 
not shown, yet are available upon request. The results are the same as for the lower house, except 
that in many countries the upper house quotas were introduced at a later stage than for the lower 
house, so the design of the quotas had already been refined. Hence, lags and time interactions are 
less important. The total effects of the quotas are very similar to those of the lower houses though. 
4.1.1 On the Exogeneity of Quotas 
We have already discussed the qualitative evidence pointing to the fact that quota introductions in 
Latin America were relatively exogenous processes with a lot of international influence. Following 
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our empirical strategy, Table 4 presents further quantitative evidence of this. First, in Column 1 we 
regress the share of women in the lower (or only) houses of parliament on a common time trend and 
a dummy for being a quota country, and include only data from elections where no quota was 
introduced (i.e., all elections in non-quota countries and only pre-quota elections in quota countries). 
The Q_country dummy then shows the difference between quota and non-quota countries prior to 
quota introductions. Column 2 does the same but includes a squared time trend. In both cases, the 
very small and statistically insignificant parameters of Q_country tell us that in terms of WiP, there 
are no measurable differences between the quota and non-quota countries prior to the quota 
introductions. Columns 3-6 do the same for the upper chambers and yield equivalent results. 
As argued, it could still be that quotas were introduced in some countries because of some other 
underlying changes in these countries, and that these would have yielded changes in the share of 
women in parliament anyway. In order to test for this, we run placebo regressions by estimating the 
share of women in parliament in the upper houses on the quotas in the lower houses. If there are 
omitted variables that affect WiP in the lower house, they should arguably do so in the upper house 
as well, whereas an exogenous quota introduced in the lower house should have no effect in the 
upper house. 
As is evident from these regressions in Columns 7-8, the introductions of quotas in the lower houses 
have no measurable correlation with WiP in the upper house. This holds even when not controlling 
for any upper house quotas (Column 7). Hence, if there are any changes in unobserved variables 
simultaneous with quota introductions, they do not seem to affect the number of women in 
parliament. Of course, this is no guarantee that any such simultaneous changes in unobserved 
variables do not affect other variables such as the dependent variables analyzed in the next section. 
4.2 Quota Effects on Policy, Participation, and Corruption 
This section comments on our results from the reduced form regressions of policy, political 
participation, and corruption.  
4.2.1 Policy 
Table 5 shows the results of regressing government spending on health, education, and social 
security as well as total social spending, all expressed in percent of GDP, on the scope of quotas in 
the lower (or only) house of parliament. All the policy tables follow the same pattern: each variable is 
regressed on the quota scope and the scope interacted with time (this time variable is 0 for all non-
quota years and starts at 1 the year after the quota). The first column is the DiD setup and the 
second adds country-specific time trends. As is evident, we find very few significant results here. 
Health spending in the DiD setup has one significant parameter, but only at the 10 percent level.  
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Table 6 shows regressions of the size of government, measured as government consumption and tax 
revenue as shares of GDP. Here we see a few significant parameters, although they are quite 
sensitive to changes in the model specification. In the DiD setup, there is no statistically significant 
effect of quotas on government consumption, but the effect becomes negative and statistically 
significant over time when controlling for country-specific time trends. For tax revenue we note a 
statistically significant positive trend after the introduction of the quotas in the DiD setup, but this 
effect disappears when we add country-specific time trends. Whether one should trust the DiD or the 
country-specific time trend estimations is unclear a priori, but given the increases of the R squares, 
the country-specific time trends seem to add a lot of information. It can also be noted that the 
significant trend parameters mentioned point in the opposite directions of the (statistically 
insignificant) direct effects of the quota introductions. 
4.2.2 Political Participation 
Columns 1-2 of Table 7 show the results from regressing the share of women who report that they 
would not vote if there were elections today on the quota scope. There is no statistically significant 
effect on women’s voting, and the same goes for the male-female gap of the same variable (Columns 
3-4). A perhaps more reliable but also in a sense more crude variable is the actual voter turnout in 
elections (Columns 5-6). This is the aggregate effect on both men and women (i.e., it could be zero 
even if there are significant effects in different directions between the sexes). We find no statistically 
significant effect here either. 
Table 8 shows the effects of quotas on variables related to self-reported political interest. The only 
statistically significant result is that of women becoming less and less interested in politics over time 
after a quota introduction (Column 6), which is contrary to expectations. However, the result does 
not hold in the DiD estimation (Column 5). Furthermore, the trend is not different from that of men 
(Columns 7-8), so if there is an effect of quotas it does not seem to differ between men and women. 
Turning to satisfaction with democratic institutions, Column 2 of Table 9 seems to indicate that 
women lose confidence in congress over time after the quota introduction (although the initial effect 
is positive), and Column 4 indicates that they may be doing so at a faster rate than men. Perhaps this 
is indicative of disappointment over non-appearance of quota effects. In line with this, Column 5 also 
seems to indicate that women become less and less satisfied with democracy, yet this effect 
becomes positive (and the immediate jump is statistically significant) when controlling for country-
specific time trends. 
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All in all, we do not seem to find any support for a boost in women’s political participation or interest 
in or satisfaction with democratic institutions as a result of quota introductions. This may be our 
most surprising result. 
4.2.3 Corruption 
Table 7 also includes two regressions of corruption (Columns 7 and 8). Whereas Column 8 shows no 
significant effect, the DiD estimation in Column 7 shows a statistically significant trend of more 
corruption after the introduction of quotas (a low level of corruption corresponds to a high value of 
the index). This is in stark contrast to previous research, which has argued for women in parliaments 
leading to less corruption. Moreover, since the quota introductions led to a significant number of 
parliamentarians being replaced with new ones, one could argue that corruption should be 
decreased by this fact alone. In this light, the lack of a positive effect of a quota is even more striking. 
5 Discussion of Potential Mechanisms 
So far we have found that quotas are effective in raising the number of women in parliaments, but 
that they have not had any clear statistically significant effects on policy, attitudes, or political 
institutions. In this section we discuss possible mechanisms for these results. In particular, we will try 
to test whether the share of women in parliament in general has any effect on our outcome 
variables, and whether the effects of women in parliament differ depending on whether or not they 
were elected with the help of quotas. Any such difference could be due to either quota women being 
different from non-quota women, or that they become marginalized by the incumbent male elite. 
Previous research has argued that the introductions of quotas were intended to break a male-
dominated structure, and that it would be likely that the incumbent elite reacts to this (Childs and 
Krook 2006; Dahlerup 2006; Grey 2006; Zetterberg 2008). One proposed strategy for the 
maintenance of status quo would be to marginalize women into positions with less power. It is not 
clear, however, that such attempts would merely be reactions to increasing women in parliaments 
via quotas. Investigating the effects of quotas on women’s political power in Mexican state 
legislatures, Zetterberg (2008) does not find women elected in a quota state to face greater obstacles 
than women elected in a no-quota state. Instead, he finds that all elected women face severe 
constraints. Fréchette et al. (2008), on the other hand, argue that the male incumbency advantage 
can increase following quotas, given that there is a bias among the voters for male candidates. This is 
so since the incumbent men will not have to compete with other men to the same extent after a 
quota introduction. Similarly, Heath et al. (2005) use data from six Latin American countries and find 
a negative correlation between share of elected women and share of women in high status 
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committees. Hence, quotas may even have a negative effect on the substantive (as opposed to the 
numerical) representation of women in politics.  
In order to test whether the quota introduction has led to increased political power for women, we 
investigate the effects of quotas on the share of women in ministerial positions. Arguably, if women 
have increased their real political power, rather than having been marginalized, this should show up 
also at the ministerial level, which in itself is unaffected by the quota. We have data on the share of 
women in ministerial positions from 1980, i.e., at a point before any country had introduced quotas, 
to 2003, when almost all quota countries had their quotas in effect. This enables us to conduct a 
convincing test of the effects of quotas on the share of female ministers in the same way as we have 
already done for WiP. If quotas for women do not lead to a higher share of women in ministerial 
positions, this can be taken as evidence of marginalization of female politicians. Table 10 shows that 
the direct effect of introducing quotas is not statistically significant. There are indications, however, 
that quotas increased the share of female ministers over time. In particular, Column 6 shows a 
statistically and substantially significant effect of having had quotas in the prior election, and 
Columns 7 and 8 similarly show a positive trend of the share of female ministers after quota 
introductions. Hence, it does not seem likely that the driving force behind our insignificant results is 
simply marginalization of elected women.  
To further investigate the absence of significant effects of gender quotas on the outcomes discussed 
in the results section, we contrast these results with those from similar estimations by regressing our 
outcome variables on the share of women in parliament directly, and only using observations from 
years in which there was no legal quota in effect6. In doing this, we are interested in finding the 
correlation between our outcome variables and the share of women in parliament that stems from 
the ordinary election process. If we find correlations when using the share of women in parliament 
but not when using the quotas, this could indicate either that the share of women in parliament is an 
endogenous variable spuriously correlated with the outcome variables or that women elected 
through gender quotas do not have the same effects on policy, political participation, and corruption 
as do women elected in non-quota elections, or a combination of the two. 
In order to keep these estimations as similar as possible to those performed for the quota, for each 
dependent variable we estimate models of the form: 
ctctcct loWiPthy   _)( , 
                                                          
6
 This is essential – if we were to include quota years, the quota effects would make up the lion part of the 
variation in the share of women in parliament.  
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where we allow for year fixed effects and add country-specific time trends by first using tth )(  
and then tth ct  )( . Hence, the first of these is again a DiD estimation with country fixed 
effects and time dummies, and the second adds country-specific time trends. It should be noted here 
that as these estimations include country fixed effects, they should reduce the (potential) 
endogeneity of women in lower house of parliament (WiP_lo) substantially by controlling for all 
unobserved time-invariant country characteristics. As in the quota estimations, we again use Newey-
West standard errors with a two period serial correlation. The estimated coefficients of WiP_lo from 
these estimations are presented in Table 11.  
Looking at public expenditure, we now see increases of public expenditure (as share of GDP) on 
health and, in one of the estimations, education being correlated with more women in parliament, 
while there is a statistically insignificant negative correlation between spending on social security and 
women in parliament. Furthermore, both total social spending and government consumption have 
sizeable positive parameters, although the statistical significance of these varies. In all, there seems 
to be some evidence of a correlation between the share of women in parliament and both spending 
priorities and the size of government. 
Turning to women’s political interest and participation, there is also some evidence that the higher 
the share of women in parliament, the more prone women are to talk about politics, to vote, and to 
have higher confidence in the congress. Furthermore, the correlation with the likelihood to vote 
seems to be significantly stronger for women than for men, judging by the positive parameter for the 
gap between men and women. Likewise, although there is no statistically significant evidence of 
women being differently interested in politics following the quotas, it seems that the gap between 
men’s and women’s interest decreases with female representation in parliament.  
Finally, the parameter for corruption is large (ICRG, the dependent variable, takes on values from 0 
for very corrupt to 5 for little corruption), positive, and statistically significant at the 10 percent level 
in the DiD model, indicating a positive correlation between a low level of corruption and high female 
representation. This is in line with the previous literature, but in stark contrast to our findings 
regarding the effects of the gender quota on corruption. The statistical significance is sensitive to 
model specification though. 
Hence, when using the share of women in parliament directly, we find quite a bit of support for 
correlations between higher female representation and policy, increases in women’s political interest 
and participation, increased confidence in congress, and lower corruption. The fact that these 
correlations can not be found when looking at the introduction of legal quotas for women’s 
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representation seems to indicate that female representation that stems from gender quotas is 
different from that of an ordinary election process. This could be for several reasons. For instance, 
one suggestion is that women elected with the help of quotas are marginalized and hold little real 
power, yet our evidence of increased shares of women ministers seems to contradict this. However, 
there may be other differences between women elected via quotas and women elected via regular 
electoral competition that reduce the potential, ability, or willingness for quota women to change 
existing policies. For instance, it is still the political parties that nominate the candidates, which may 
result in women close to the incumbent (male) elites being chosen to fill out the quotas. In line with 
this, Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) find that the perception of many politicians in Argentina is that 
women elected by quotas have been placed there because they are loyal to the party or tied to a 
male politician. Whether it is true or not, such perceptions may affect the power or willingness of 
women in parliament to change policy.  
However, it could also be that correlations between women in parliament and the outcome variables 
are spurious in that higher female representation and other outcomes are all driven by unobserved 
factors, e.g., by some broader sense of gender equality in society, which in turn is not correlated with 
the introduction of gender quotas. If the former is true, it seems that using gender quotas as a “fast 
track” to gender-equal representation may not – at least over the time periods spanned here – be 
very successful other than in terms of nominal representation. If the latter is true, it seems that 
female representation, while likely desirable for other reasons, may not be very important for actual 
policy, women’s political interest and participation, or corruption. 
6 Conclusion 
Previous research has shown that quotas for women in politics affect the distribution of public goods, 
attitudes toward women, and the probability of women being elected even after the quotas are 
withdrawn. These findings are, however, based on different types of quotas, for different levels of 
government and in different countries, than in the present study. In this article, we assess the effects 
of quotas in Latin American national parliaments on a wide range of outcomes. 
Although we find substantial and statistically significant effects of quotas on the number of women in 
parliament, we find very few statistically significant results on political participation, policies, and 
corruption. If anything, it seems that the political interest and participation have gone down among 
women after quota introductions. In stark contrast to earlier research, we also find that gender 
quotas have possibly raised corruption levels. All these effects of quotas, apart from the direct effect 
on the share of women in parliament, are sensitive to model specification though. The lack of 
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significant effects indicates that the increased share of women in national parliaments resulting from 
quotas has had close to no substantial measurable effects beyond numerical representation in Latin 
America. This conclusion is also strengthened by the fact that when using the share of women in 
parliament directly, we find correlations with policies, political participation, and corruption much 
more in line with expectations. This indicates that to the extent that these correlations are causal 
effects, they do not seem to carry over to an increased share of women in parliament following a 
quota. 
This finding contrasts some of the previous studies investigating the effects of quotas.  Chattopadhay 
and Duflo (2004) and Beaman et al. (2009) found that quotas at the lowest level of governance 
(village councils) in India affected the distribution of public goods in favor of women’s preferences 
and also reduced negative stereotypes toward women. Clots-Figueras (2011) found that quotas for 
women in Indian states increase spending on education, whereas Campa (2011) found no effects of 
quotas on spending outcomes in Spanish local governments.  
It is obvious that results of the same rules may be different in different contexts, and looking at the 
preferences of women in Latin America, it is far from evident that one should expect a larger 
government or more spending on health or education as has been proposed before. This also holds 
true with respect to corruption as shown by Alatas et al. (2011). Nonetheless, not taking quota 
introductions into account, we are able to reproduce statistically significant effects of women in 
parliament on, e.g., corruption and spending on health care, which may indicate either that the 
correlation between women in parliament and our outcomes is spuriously driven by other time-
variant factors or that increasing women in parliaments via quotas has some other adverse effects. 
However, it is also the case that the quotas studied in previous research are at a lower level of 
governance, which is also likely to be of importance. For instance, it is possible that at the national 
level, the women who are placed on the party lists are those closest to male-leaning party elites. 
Hence, quotas in national elections may not be effective in increasing the effective representation of 
women’s preferences, but only in increasing the number of women in parliament. 
Finally, the types of quotas studied here are also different from those in the previous literature. The 
quotas we investigate are most similar to those investigated by Campa (2011), as the quotas in both 
cases imply that a certain proportion of women must be on the electoral lists, as opposed to 
reserved seats whereby a certain share of the actual representatives must be women. Furthermore, 
the quotas in Latin America do not say anything about the role of the women once they have been 
elected, which is in strong contrast to the quotas at the Indian village level, which allocate chief 
positions, including agenda setting power, to women. Although we show that the quotas in Latin 
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America did lead to increased power for women in terms of ministerial positions, it remains unclear 
whether they substantially enhanced women’s political power beyond raising the number of female 
ministers. Based on existing levels of knowledge, it is too early to draw conclusions about the 
importance of agenda-setting power, level of governance, or context more generally, and we 
therefore urge future studies to further investigate the causal effects of different types of quotas in 
other settings.  
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8 Figures and Tables 
Table 1. Quotas. Years of quota introductions. 
Country Year of first quota law Year of first quota election 
Argentina 1991 1993 
Bolivia 1993 1997 
Brazil 1996 1998 
Chile - - 
Colombia - - 
Costa Rica 1997 1998 
Dominican Rep. 1997 1998 
Ecuador 1997 1998 
Guatemala - - 
Honduras 2000 2001 
Mexico 2002 2003 
Nicaragua - - 
Panama 1997 1999 
Peru 1997 2000 
Paraguay 1996 1998 
El Salvador - - 
Uruguay - - 
Venezuela 1997 1998   
- indicates that no quota was introduced during the analyzed period.  
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Table 2. Variables. Description of variables 
 
Variables Description Source 
 
Independent variables of 
main interest  
 
Q_ineffect Dummy =1 if quota is in effect   
Q_size_lo Scope of legal quota (share of candidates that must be women, 0 
implies no quota and 1 implies 100 percent quota) for elections in 
lower chamber. 
Quotaproject 
Q_size_hi Same as q_scope_lo but for upper parliament. Quotaproject 
Q_country =1 for countries that at some point 1990-2009 introduced some legal 
gender quota for national elections; 0 otherwise. 
Quotaproject 
 
Dependent variables  
 
Women in Politics   
WiP_lo Share of women in the lower chamber of parliament.  IPU 
WiP_hi Share of women in the upper chamber of parliament.  IPU 
 
 
female_ministers Share of women in ministerial positions. 
Escobar-Lemmon 
and Taylor-Robinson 
(2005)  
 
Policy  
 
Govcons General government final consumption expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP. 
WDI 
taxrevenue_gdpshare Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. ECLAC 
educspending_gdpshare Public expenditure on education as percentage of GDP. ECLAC 
healthspending_gdpshare Public expenditure on health as percentage of GDP. ECLAC 
socsecspending_gdpshare Public expenditure on social security as percentage of GDP. ECLAC 
soctotspending_gdpshare Public expenditure on total social spending as percentage of GDP. ECLAC 
 
Political Participation  
 
Donttalkpolitics =1 if the respondent never or almost never talks about politics with 
friends; 0 otherwise. Country and year averages. 
Latino-barometer 
Notinterestedpol =1 if the respondent is not very interested or not interested at 
all in politics; 0 otherwise. Country and year averages. 
Latino-barometer 
Notvoting =1 if respondent answer would not vote next Sunday; 0 otherwise. 
(No response and do not know coded as missing.) Country and year 
averages. 
Latino-barometer 
election_turnout_lo The total number of votes cast in lower house elections as a 
percent of the voting age population. Country and year averages. 
IDEA voter turnout 
database 
Noconfidencecongress =1 if the respondent has little or no confidence in the National 
Congress; 0 otherwise. Country and year averages. 
Latino-barometer 
Satisfieddemocracy =1 if the respondent is very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the 
way democracy works in the country X; 0 if not satisfied or not at 
all satisfied. Country and year averages. 
Latino-barometer 
*_gap All measures from the Latinobarometer allow us to create the 
gender gap of each country and year. These are created as the 
average for men less that of women. 
Latino-barometer 
 
Corruption  
 
ICRG International Country Risk Group’s index of perceived corruption. 
Ranging from 0 (very much corruption) to 5 (no corruption). 
ICRG 
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Table 3. WiP lower. Fixed effects estimations of the share of women in the lower (or only) house of parliament. 
 
  -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8  
VARIABLES  t t i.t c*t i.t c*t i.t c*t   
Q_ineffect_lo 0.058***        
  (0.014)        
Q_size_lo   0.216*** 0.249*** 0.105** 0.111* 0.086** 0.115** 0.130*** 
   (0.045) (0.052) (0.046) (0.057) (0.042) (0.051) (0.042) 
L.Q_size_lo     0.249*** 0.162***   
      (0.059) (0.040)   
Q_size_lo * T       0.040*** 0.027*** 
        (0.008) (0.007)  
t  0.005*** 0.005***       
  (0.001) (0.001)       
Year     yes  yes  yes    
dummies    
Country spec.    yes  yes  yes  
time trends 
Constant  0.049*** 0.050*** 0.061*** 0.045*** 0.060*** 0.054*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.007) (0.015) (0.006) (0.014) (0.007)   
N  115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
R-squared  0.623 0.641 0.741 0.842 0.792 0.870 0.812 0.868 
Number of countryid 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
   
  
Table 4. Some tests. Tests of pre-quota differences in female representation between quota and non-quota countries 
(Columns 1-6), and placebo estimations of the effect of lower house quota introductions on upper house 
representation.  
 
Dependent: wip_lo   wip_up        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
Q_country -0.00926 -0.00869 0.0161 0.0160     
 (0.00810) (0.00807) (0.0107) (0.0108)     
Q_country     0.0181 0.0177   
     (0.0119) (0.0122)   
Q_sizee_lo       0.0206 -0.160 
       (0.0968) (0.104) 
Q_sizee_up        0.368*** 
        (0.112)  
t 0.00338*** 0.00254 0.00294*** 0.00434 0.00304*** 0.00412 0.00460*** 0.00422*** 
 (0.000676) (0.00234) (0.000918) (0.00352) (0.000961) (0.00353) (0.00149) (0.00136) 
t2  3.45e-05  -5.59e-05  -4.30e-05   
  (9.08e-05)  (0.000139)  (0.000145)   
Constant 0.0585*** 0.0617*** 0.0213 0.0155 0.0215* 0.0172 0.0250 0.0268* 
 (0.0107) (0.0145) (0.0128) (0.0184) (0.0126) (0.0178) (0.0164) (0.0150)  
N 88 88 50 50 50 50 62 62 
R-squared 0.345 0.346 0.213 0.216 0.222 0.224 0.303 0.430  
N countries       11 11  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Country fixed effects included in Column 8.        
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Table 5. Gov size 1. Fixed effects, reduced form effect of quota introduction.   
      
Dependent: Health spend (% GDP) Educ. spend (% GDP) Soc. Sec spend (% GDP) Tot Soc. spend (% GDP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
Q_size_lo 0.276 0.676* 0.0397 0.160 0.721 0.483 0.177 1.083 
 (0.320) (0.348) (0.584) (0.384) (0.708) (0.595) (1.087) (0.991) 
Q_size*T -0.0681 0.0389 -0.112 -0.0463 -0.109 0.0281 -0.359 0.406 
 (0.0604) (0.126) (0.101) (0.145) (0.171) (0.190) (0.241) (0.356)  
Year  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  
dummies  
Country spec. yes  yes  yes  yes 
time trends          
Constant 2.839*** 3.404*** 5.136*** 4.128*** 5.119*** -1.512 13.46*** 10.42*** 
 (0.234) (0.595) (0.305) (0.484) (0.600) (1.695) (0.783) (1.152)  
N 322 322 322 322 300 300 322 322 
R-squared 0.257 0.422 0.479 0.664 0.302 0.702 0.503 0.687 
N countries 18 18 18 18 17 17 18 18  
Newey-West standard errors with two period serial correlation in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
    
 
 
Table 6. Gov size 2. Fixed effects, reduced form effect of quota introduction.   
 
Dependent: Govmnt Cons. (% GDP) Tax Revenue (% GDP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Q_size_lo 4.337 2.716 -2.072 -1.602 
 (2.671) (2.370) (1.454) (1.100) 
Q_size*T 0.402 -1.438** 0.666*** -0.431 
 (0.413) (0.627) (0.246) (0.326)  
Year  yes yes yes yes   
dummies  
Country spec. yes  yes  
time trends      
Constant 12.72*** 4.012* 16.73*** 7.492*** 
 (1.257) (2.063) (0.527) (1.976)  
N 448 448 360 360 
R-squared 0.078 0.597 0.494 0.785 
N countries 18 18 18 18  
Newey-West standard errors with two period serial correlation  
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 7. Political participation. Fixed effects, reduced form effect of quota introduction.   
     
  
Dependent: Female Notvoting Notvoting_gap Election_turnout_lo Corruption  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
Q_size_lo -0.138 -0.125 0.0628 0.0178 11.00 11.34 0.0516 0.114 
 (0.105) (0.150) (0.0403) (0.0497) (13.24) (13.80) (0.640) (0.634) 
Q_size*T 0.0143 0.0985 0.00449 -0.0321 -1.512 -4.738 -0.329** -0.148 
 (0.0188) (0.0762) (0.00574) (0.0203) (2.616) (3.789) (0.153) (0.210)  
Year  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  
dummies  
Country spec. yes  yes  yes  yes 
time trends          
Constant 0.270*** -0.865 -0.0632*** 0.521 75.24*** 83.11*** 3.108*** 2.675*** 
 (0.0519) (0) (0.0128) (0) (5.476) (7.193) (0.414) (0.156)  
N 182 182 182 182 122 122 378 378 
R-squared 0.191 0.309 0.208 0.311 0.172 0.512 0.234 0.543 
N countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18  
Newey-West standard errors with two period serial correlation in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
Table 8. Political interest. Fixed effects, reduced form effect of quota introduction.   
     
Dependent: Fem. donttalkpolitics Donttalkpolitics_gap Fem. Notinterestedpol Notinterestedpol_gap  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
q_scope_lo 0.0226 -0.0151 -0.00768 0.0124 -0.0472 0.0196 -0.0304 -0.0622 
 (0.0415) (0.0454) (0.0276) (0.0341) (0.0751) (0.0862) (0.0366) (0.0457) 
Q_size*T -0.00272 -0.0128 0.00812* 0.00916 0.0174 0.105*** -0.00358 -0.0277 
 (0.00787) (0.0259) (0.00454) (0.0154) (0.0145) (0.0396) (0.00639) (0.0185)  
Year  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  
dummies  
Country spec. yes  yes  yes  yes 
time trends          
Constant 0.918*** 0.858 -0.116*** -0.904 0.611*** 0.656 -0.0594** 0.283 
 (0.0279) (0) (0.0113) (0) (0.0414) (0) (0.0229) (0)  
N 147 147 147 147 164 164 164 164 
R-squared 0.116 0.324 0.117 0.303 0.278 0.524 0.207 0.309 
N countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18  
Newey-West standard errors with two period serial correlation in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
  
   
 
34 
 
 
Table 9. Political satisfaction. Fixed effects, reduced form effect of quota introduction.   
     
Dependent: Fem. Noconf.congress Noconf.congr_gap Fem. satisfieddemocr. Satisfieddemocracy_gap 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
Q_size_lo -0.0779 -0.187** -0.0159 -0.0204 0.0520 0.246** 0.00195 -0.0282 
 (0.0796) (0.0831) (0.0337) (0.0502) (0.0808) (0.0984) (0.0304) (0.0425) 
Q_size*T 0.0233 0.0746** 0.00371 -0.0394** -0.0403** 0.00379 -0.00431 0.00501 
 (0.0165) (0.0329) (0.00507) (0.0173) (0.0159) (0.0543) (0.00604) (0.0191)  
Year  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  
dummies  
Country spec. yes  yes  yes  yes 
time trends          
Constant 0.529*** -0.615 0.00319 0.511 0.559*** 0.298 0.0407** 0.394 
 (0.0581) (0) (0.0143) (0) (0.0520) (0) (0.0172) (0)  
N 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 
R-squared 0.296 0.592 0.151 0.267 0.287 0.404 0.110 0.242 
N countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18  
Newey-West standard errors with two period serial correlation in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
    
Table 10. Female ministers. Fixed effects estimations of the share of female ministers. 
 
  -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8  
VARIABLES  t t i.t c*t i.t c*t i.t c*t   
Q_ineffect_lo 0.020        
  (0.020)        
Q_size_lo   0.095 0.063 0.040 0.062 0.032 0.031 0.020 
   (0.066) (0.083) (0.080) (0.087) (0.078) (0.082) (0.074) 
L.Q_size_lo     0.008 0.175**   
      (0.108) (0.086)   
Q_size*T       0.046** 0.060*** 
        (0.023) (0.019)  
t  0.007*** 0.007***       
  (0.001) (0.001)       
year     yes  yes  yes    
dummies    
Country spec.    yes  yes  yes   
time trends           
Constant  0.017 0.019 0.040* 0.015 0.040* 0.022* 0.042** 0.025** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.020) (0.012)  
Observations 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
R-squared  0.623 0.641 0.741 0.842 0.792 0.870 0.812 0.868 
Number of countryid 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 11. Fixed effects estimations of various outcomes on the share of women in parliament (non-
quota years only). 
      
Dependent Model Coefficient Std. Err. N  
Policy  
healthspending_gdpshare FE, year dummies 2.858* (1.728) 224  
 FE, Country*t 3.622** (1.485) 224  
educspending_gdpshare FE, year dummies 1.513 (2.165) 224  
 FE, Country*t 3.285* (1.700) 224  
socsecspending_gdpshare FE, year dummies -4.467 (3.755) 204  
 FE, Country*t -2.074 (1.455) 204  
soctotspending_gdpshare FE, year dummies 3.214 (4.850) 224  
 FE, Country*t 11.41*** (4.041) 224  
govcons FE, year dummies 30.20* (17.42) 308  
 FE, Country*t 16.61 (12.22) 308  
taxrevenue_gdpshare FE, year dummies -6.226 (5.261) 242  
 FE, Country*t 3.380 (4.344) 242  
Political participation 
and interest  
f_donttalkpolitics FE, year dummies -0.752*** (0.232) 92  
 FE, Country*t -0.203 (0.330) 92  
donttalkpolitics_gap FE, year dummies -0.0126 (0.112) 92  
 FE, Country*t -0.0725 (0.227) 92  
f_notinterestedpol FE, year dummies -0.641 (0.443) 101  
 FE, Country*t -0.481 (0.330) 101  
notinterestedpol_gap FE, year dummies 0.252** (0.124) 101  
 FE, Country*t 0.342* (0.194) 101  
f_noconfidencecongress FE, year dummies -0.980** (0.476) 116  
 FE, Country*t -0.763 (0.484) 116  
noconfidencecongress_gap FE, year dummies 0.0554 (0.121) 116  
 FE, Country*t 0.0115 (0.163) 116  
f_satisfieddemocracy FE, year dummies 0.526 (0.489) 116  
 FE, Country*t 0.170 (0.725) 116  
satisfieddemocracy_gap FE, year dummies 0.220* (0.126) 116  
 FE, Country*t 0.0597 (0.185) 116  
f_notvoting FE, year dummies -0.934 (0.603) 101  
 FE, Country*t -1.769** (0.731) 101  
notvoting_gap FE, year dummies 0.379** (0.165) 101  
 FE, Country*t 0.440*** (0.161) 101  
election_turnout_lo FE, year dummies -49.79 (79.94) 83  
 FE, Country*t -21.77 (83.19) 83  
Corruption  
icrg FE, year dummies 4.790* (2.517) 281  
 FE, Country*t 3.475 (2.358) 281  
Note: Coefficients of wip_lo, the share of women in the lower or only house of parliament, from fixed effects estimations of 
various dependents. Observations from years when there was a legal gender quota in effect have been removed. For each 
dependent, the wip_lo coefficients from two models are presented: one with country fixed effects and year dummies, and 
one that also adds country specific time trends. Newey-West standard errors with two period serial correlation in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
